EN BANC
Panganiban, C.J.,
Puno,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
- versus - Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario,
Garcia,
Velasco, Jr., JJ.
RENE
Appellant. Promulgated:
x
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
For
allegedly sexually assaulting 5-year-old AAA, Rene Santos was charged with Rape
in an Information[1] alleging
–
That on or about in the afternoon of between 17th and 23rd of July 1999 in the [B]arangay of xxx, [M]unicipality of xxx, [P]rovince of Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, RENE SANTOS, with lewd designs and by means of deceit, force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeeded in having carnal knowledge with AAA, 5 years of age, against her will.
Contrary to law.
Upon
arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.[2] Trial thereafter ensued, after which the
Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, Branch 55, rendered judgment[3]
imposing the death penalty thus:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and as a consequence of which, this Court hereby sentences him to suffer the mandatory penalty of death and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P75,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Owing
to the imposition of the death penalty, the case was elevated to the Court for automatic
review. Pursuant, however, to the ruling
in People v. Mateo,[5] the case was referred to the Court of
Appeals for evaluation in a Resolution dated September 7, 2004.[6]
In his appeal, appellant alleged that
–
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED THAT WOULD EXCULPATE HIM FROM THE CRIME OF RAPE.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED UPON THE ACCUSED THE MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH.
In
its Decision[7] dated
October 19, 2005, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of conviction and,
in addition to the P75,000.00 civil indemnity imposed, ordered appellant to pay
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The
prosecution’s version of the incident narrates that sometime between July 17
and 23, 1999, AAA was playing at the northern portion of
After
a complaint was lodged with the barangay and the police authorities, AAA was
brought to the
Appellant’s
version of the incident is one of denial and alibi. He testified that he was the driver of BBB
who lived in Barangay xxx, xxx, Pampanga which is a kilometer away from his
place in Sulipan.[14] Appellant usually leaves his house at
His job was to drive his employer
whenever the latter had appointments in
On
We have examined the evidence on
record and find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals. We accord great
respect on the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies, for the trial judge observes the behavior and demeanor of
the witnesses in court. His evaluation
or assessment of the credibility of witnesses and of testimony acquires greater
significance in rape cases because from the nature of the offense, the only
evidence that can oftentimes be offered to establish the guilt of the accused
is the victim’s testimony.”[25]
This credibility given by the trial
court to the rape victim is an important aspect of evidence which appellate
courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses,
particularly their demeanor, conduct and attitude during the direct and
cross-examination by counsel.[26] It is likewise well established that the
testimony of a rape victim is generally given full weight and credit, more so,
if she is a 5-year-old child as in this case.
The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been abused
deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the trouble and the
humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her
complaint. In so testifying, she could
only have been impelled to tell the truth, especially in the absence of proof
of ill motive.[27]
The trial court and the Court of
Appeals gave credence to the testimony of AAA who was only six years old when
she narrated the sordid details of her ravishment, viz:
FISCAL PINEDA
Questioning
If Rene Santos is inside this courtroom, can you point at him?
WITNESS
Answering
Yes, sir.
Q Please point at him?
A There he is, sir.
INTERPRETER
Witness pointed to a person inside the courtroom who [when] asked gave his name as Rene Santos.
Q Between the period of
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you then?
A . . .
Q You said you know this Rene Santos, why do you know him?
A Because he raped me, sir.
Q Can you remember when was that?
A Yes, sir.
Q When?
WITNESS
Answering
I do not know when, sir.
FISCAL PINEDA
Questioning
Do you recall where?
A In their house, sir.
Q And where is that house?
A In Sulipan, sir.
Q In Apalit, Pampanga?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that this Rene Santos raped you, what
particular actuations did he do?
A He inserted his penis, sir.
Q Where?
A Here, sir, in my vagina.
INTERPRETER
Witness pointing to her private organ.
Q Where did that happen?
A In their house, sir.
Q In what portion of his house?
A Inside their house, sir.
Q You said that Rene Santos inserted his penis
into your vagina, what did you feel?
A I felt pain, sir.
Q When he inserted his penis into your vagina did he have any clothings (sic)?
A . . .
ATTY. VIOLA
Leading, Your Honor.
COURT
Reform the question.
FISCAL PINEDA
Questioning
When he inserted his penis into your vagina, what was his appearance?
WITNESS
Answering
It was hard, sir.
Q What was hard?
A His penis, sir.
COURT
Questioning
Is this Rene Santos inside this courtroom?
WITNESS
Answering
Yes, sir.
Q Point to him?
A There he is, sir.
INTERPRETER
Witness pointed to a person inside the courtroom who when asked gave his name as Rene Santos.[28] (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Counsel
for the defense attempted, albeit futilely, to impeach the credibility of the
victim.[29] We have held time and again that testimonies
of rape victims who are young and immature, as in this case, deserve full
credence considering that no young woman, especially one of tender age, would
concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and
thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial if she was not
motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed
against her. It is highly improbable for
an innocent girl of tender years like the victim, who is very naive to the
things of this world, to fabricate a charge so humiliating not only to herself
but also to her family. Stated succinctly, it is beyond the mind-set of a
six-year old child, like the offended party herein, to fabricate a malicious
accusation against appellant if the crime did not truly transpire.[30] Verily, when a guileless girl of six credibly
declares that she has been raped, she has said all that is necessary to prove
the ravishment of her honor.[31]
Appellant’s
reliance on the corroboration by his wife of his alibi cannot overturn the
clear and categorical declarations of the victim identifying him as the
perpetrator of the crime. The corroboration
should, furthermore, be received with caution coming as it does from
appellant’s spouse whose emotional ties and interest in his acquittal cannot be
gainsaid. Indeed, it has even been held
that some wives are overwhelmed by emotional attachment to their husbands such
that they knowingly or otherwise suppress the truth and act as a medium for
injustice to preponderate.[32]
In
addition to his defense of alibi, appellant further faults the trial court with
“acting as the prosecutor and the judge at the same time”[33]
for allegedly initiating and propounding “the questions, short of supplying the
desired answer from the witness.”[34]
The
argument is tenuous. As has been pointed out in People v. Guambor:[35]
The trial judge is accorded
a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential
to elicit relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges
of both law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of
their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a
failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some
material bearing upon the outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may
put such question to the witness as will enable him to formulate a sound
opinion as to the ability and willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A
judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory
questions to test the credibility of
the witness and to extract the truth.
He may seek to draw out relevant and
material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the
position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds
happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party. (Emphasis
supplied)
The
trend in procedural law is to give a wide latitude to the courts in exercising
control over the questioning of a child witness.[36] Under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rules on
Examination of a Child Witness,[37]
child witnesses may testify in a narrative form and leading questions may be allowed by the trial court in all stages of
the examination if the same will further the interest of justice.[38] It must be borne in mind that the offended
party in this case is a 6-year old minor
who was barely five when she was
sexually assaulted. As a child of such
tender years not yet exposed to the ways of the world, she could not have fully
understood the enormity of the bestial act committed on her person. Indeed –
Studies show that children, particularly very young children, make the “perfect victims.” They naturally follow the authority of adults as the socialization process teaches children that adults are to be respected. The child’s age and developmental level will govern how much she comprehends about the abuse and therefore how much it affects her. If the child is too young to understand what has happened to her, the effects will be minimized because she has no comprehension of the consequences. Certainly, children have more problems in providing accounts of events because they do not understand everything they experience. They do not have enough life experiences from which to draw upon in making sense of what they see, hear, taste, smell and feel. Moreover, they have a limited vocabulary…. With her limited comprehension, the child could not have a perfect way of relating that she had been sexually abused.[39] (Emphasis and italics supplied)
The
record discloses that the questions propounded by the judge were intended to
elicit the truth from the child witness.
This perceived undue inquisitiveness of the judge did not unduly harm
the substantial rights of the appellant.
In fact, it is only to be expected from the judge who, with full
consciousness of his responsibilities could not, and should not, easily be
satisfied with incompleteness and obscurities in the testimonies of the
witness.[40]
While judges should as much as
possible refrain from showing partiality to one party and hostility to another,
it does not mean that a trial judge should keep mum throughout the trial and
allow parties to ask questions that they desire, on issues which they think are
important, when the former are improper and the latter immaterial. If trials are to be expedited, judges must
take a leading part therein, by directing counsel to submit evidence on the
facts in dispute by asking clarifying questions, and by showing an interest in
a fast and fair trial. Judges are not mere
referees like those of a boxing bout, only to watch and decide the results of a
game; they should have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and
expeditious presentation of evidence, calling attention of counsel to points at
issue that are overlooked, directing them to ask the question that would elicit
the facts on the issues involved, and clarifying ambiguous remarks by
witnesses. Unless they take an active part in trials in the above form and
manner, and allow counsel to ask questions whether pertinent or impertinent,
material or immaterial, the speedy administration of justice which is the aim
of the Government and of the people cannot be attained.[41]
Appellant
also invites the Court’s attention to what he perceives as uncharacteristic
behavior of the victim who, according to him, should be traumatized after
undergoing “the onslaught of sexual molestation.”[42] He insists that it is unnatural for the
6-year old victim to go to school the day following her supposedly shocking
experience. He also points out that “she
was answering not as seriously as one who has been sexually molested.”[43]
The
contention is neither novel nor persuasive.
There is no standard form of behavior that can be expected of rape
victims after they have been defiled because people react differently to
emotional stress.[44] Nobody can tell how a victim of sexual
aggression is supposed to act or behave after her ordeal.[45] Certainly, it is difficult to predict in
every instance how a person – especially a 6-year old child, as in this case –
would react to a traumatic experience.[46] It is not proper to judge the actions of rape
victims, especially children, who have undergone the harrowing experience of
being ravished against their will by the norms of behavior expected under such
circumstances from mature persons.[47] Indeed, the range of emotions shown by rape
victims is yet to be captured even by calculus.[48] It is thus unrealistic to expect uniform
reactions from them.[49] In fact, the Court has not laid down any rule
on how a rape victim should behave immediately after her ravishment.[50]
In
his attempt to extricate himself from criminal liability, appellant further
insinuates that his sons may be the possible perpetrators of the felony saying
that “it could have been Rene Santos, Jr. or Michael Santos who could have
raped the victim” considering that AAA and her sister CCC allegedly complained
earlier that they were raped by the two brothers.[51]
If
at all, the foregoing suggestion that his sons may have been the malefactors
who sexually assaulted the victim and her sister only succeeds in underscoring
his moral depravity and his capacity to commit the crime. Only one whose degree of wickedness plumbs
the deepest depths of criminal perversity would have no qualms of laying the
onus of his guilt even on his own offspring and, worse, blacken the memory of
one of them who is already dead in his endeavor to exculpate himself from the
consequences of his felonious acts.
Much
less convincing is appellant’s proposition that ill feelings and ill motives of
the victim’s mother impelled the filing of the charges against him. Ill-motives become inconsequential where
there are affirmative or categorical declarations establishing appellant’s accountability
for the felony.[52] We have, furthermore, observed not a few
persons convicted of rape have attributed the charges against them to family
feuds, resentment or revenge.[53] However, as borne out by a plethora of cases,
family resentment, revenge or feuds have never swayed us from giving full
credence to the testimony of a complainant for rape, especially a minor who
remained steadfast and unyielding throughout the direct and cross-examination
that she was sexually abused.[54] It would take a certain degree of perversity
on the part of a parent, especially a mother, to concoct a false charge of rape
and then use her daughter as an instrument to settle her grudge.[55]
Given
the foregoing factual, legal and jurisprudential scenario, we agree with both the
trial and appellate courts that the appellant is guilty as charged. He was, likewise, correctly meted the penalty
of death because rape committed against a “child
below seven (7) years old” is a
dastardly and repulsive crime which merits no less than the imposition of
capital punishment under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.[56] That AAA was only five years old when she was ravished is clear from her birth
certificate.[57]
However,
with the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled “An Act Prohibiting The Imposition Of The Death Penalty In The
Philippines,” the penalty that should be meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the same law, appellant
shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
In line with prevailing
jurisprudence, the Court affirms the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and increases the Court of Appeals’ award of
moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.[58]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. H.C. No. 01424 finding appellant Rene Santos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and odering him to indemnify the victim
the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is increased to P75,000.00 and
that in lieu of the death penalty, appellant Rene Santos is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without possibility of parole.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Records, p. 1.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[6] Rollo, p. 116. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso and concurred in by Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Lucas P. Bersamin.
[7]
[8]
TSN,
[9]
[10]
[11]
TSN,
[12] TSN,
[13]
TSN,
[14]
TSN,
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
TSN,
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] People v. Macapal, G.R. No. 155335,
[26] People v. Cayabyab, G.R. No. 167147,
[27] People v. Dimaano, G.R. No. 168168,
[28]
TSN,
[29]
[30] People v. Villafuerte, G.R. No. 154917,
[31] People v. Cachapero, G.R. No. 153008,
[32] People v. Fontanilla, G.R. Nos. 147662-63,
[33] Appellant’s Reply Brief, rollo, p. 110.
[34]
[35]
G.R. No. 152183,
[36] People v. Escultor, G.R. Nos. 149366-67,
[37]
A.M. No. 004-07-SC which took effect
SEC. 19. Modes of questioning. – The court shall exercise control over the questioning of children so as to (1) facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) ensure that the questions are stated in a form appropriate to the development level of the child, (3) protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time.
SEC. 20. Leading questions. – The court may allow leading questions in all stages of examination of a child if the same will further the interests of justice.
SEC. 21. Objection to questions. – Objections to questions should be couched in a manner so as not to mislead, confuse, frighten or intimidate the child.
[38] People v. Cañete, 448 Phil. 127, 141-142 (2003).
[39] People v. Gaudia, G.R. No. 146111,
[40] People v. Angcap, 150 Phil. 500, 507 (1972).
[41]
[42] Reply Brief, rollo, p. 111.
[43]
[44] People v. Francisco, 448 Phil. 805, 820 (2003).
[45] People v. Umayam, 450 Phil. 543, 562 (2003).
[46] People v. Manahan, 455 Phil. 658, 670 (2003).
[47] People v. Tonyacao, G.R. Nos. 134531-32,
[48] People v. Negosa, 456 Phil. 861, 873 (2003).
[49] People v. Capareda, G.R. No. 128363,
[50] People v. Montes, G.R. Nos. 148743-45,
[51] Memorandum of Appellant, rollo, pp. 49-50.
[52] People v. Guambor, G.R. No. 152183,
[53] People v. Cariñaga, 456 Phil. 944, 968 (2003).
[54] People v. Glodo, G.R No. 136085,
[55] People v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 139351,
[56] People v. Cayabyab, G.R. No. 167147,
[57] Exhibit “C,” records, p. 30.
[58] People
v. Salome, G.R. No. 169077,